by  Tehrene Firman, Well+Good  — Being healthy at the airport can be a true struggle: It’s a stressful place, there are germs everywhere, and the nutritious food offerings seem slim to none (though, to be fair, advancements are progressing on that front). And to make sure you’re eating as healthy as possible, you might, shockingly, want to […]

Article represents opinion of the Author 

by Aurélie Daher   lobelog.com —   One could say: “What a difference!” Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri is back in Riyadh this week, for the first time since he announced from the Saudi capital his canceled-two-weeks-later “resignation” last November. So far, things look all lovey-dovey again between the kingdom and its Lebanese Sunni protégé. Could that mean that Riyadh has learned its lesson from what many saw as a major strategic mistake by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS)? Does Hariri himself feel more confident facing his regional godfather? Things are not so easy to decipher, although much is at stake. A quick reminder. On November 3 last year, Saad Hariri was “urgently invited” to Riyadh where he was expected to meet King Salman bin Abdel Aziz for a “work meeting.” The very next day, he announced his resignation from his job as prime minister—and vehemently assailed both Iran and Hezbollah, whom he accused of “planning to assassinate him.” Both the news of the resignation and the aggressive tone sounded bizarre to the large majority of the political class and people in Lebanon, particularly because Hariri had spent a lot of time before his resignation reassuring everyone that, despite rumors, he intended to remain in office. The invective he hurled at his opponents appeared to flagrantly violate the “Presidential Compromise” struck a year before in October 2016 among all political parties that provided for Hariri’s return to the prime ministership, as well as the installation of Michel Aoun, a Christian ally of Hezbollah, as president.

These developments and the many leaks that followed his surprise resignation strongly suggested that the Saudis had forced Hariri into the decision. Their aim was to provoke an insurgency within the Sunni political class, encourage the Sunnis to escalate their rhetoric against Hezbollah, and dismantle a government that would have been replaced by a new one that excluded the Shiite party, consequences be damned. The whole plan backfired. The Lebanese Sunnis did not rebel against their Shiite compatriots but instead against the Saudi patron. Lebanese from all sects were infuriated by what they felt to be both a violation of their national sovereignty and an infantilizing attitude towards the main leader of one of Lebanon’s main confessional and political communities.

Saudi Arabia chose at first to escalate. Things reached a point where everyone feared the whole Middle East was on the brink of a devastating regional war or at least an extension of the Iraqi or Syrian level of violence into Lebanon. Eventually, however, Saudi Arabia, under French and U.S. pressure, was persuaded to step back, release its Lebanese detainee, and accept the status quo ante in Lebanon to the extent that it could be restored. This week, Riyadh tried to send some positive messages to the Lebanese political elite and people. First, in a telling move, the kingdom sent an envoy to Beirut to deliver an official “invitation” to Hariri to come to Saudi Arabia. Second, the choice of envoy who is now in charge of the Lebanese file, Nizar Alaoula, is an affable and diplomatic man, a major contrast to his incendiary predecessor, Thamer Sabhan, who played a highly negative role in the November crisis and was accused by too many Lebanese and Western officials of acting like a pyromaniac of Sunni-Shiite relations in Lebanon and in the region. Third, although Riyadh was still boycotting Aoun last fall, Alaoula insisted on meeting with the president before anyone else. He didn’t stay long, but long enough to state publicly that “Saudi Arabia respects Lebanon’s sovereignty and supports its stability.” And if he did not push the reconciliation process as far as getting together with Hezbollah officials, he did pay a visit to Nabih Berri, head of parliament and the chief of Hezbollah’s main ally, AMAL, the second Shiite party. Aloula even praised Berri as a “national figure who embodies hope and optimism.” Finally, the Saudi emissary chose not to meet Ashraf Rifi, a staunch Sunni client of Riyadh, albeit one who has harshly criticized Hariri.

Has Saudi Arabia Learned its Lesson?

One question still hangs over the present moment, however. Is Hariri’s departure to Riyadh a “visit” or a summons? Hariri headed to Riyadh the very next day after Aloula arrived in Beirut. The Saudi envoy was supposed to stay the week, but Hariri was obviously in a hurry to meet his mentors again—or is it the other way around? In fact, he left 24 hours after Alaoula landed in Beirut, forcing the new envoy to shorten his stay and accompany the prime minister to Riyadh. Not all of the details of his stay in Riyadh are yet available. In November, a squad of Royal Guards met Hariri at the airport and immediately confiscated his phone and those of his bodyguards. This time, a number of high-ranking Saudi diplomats greeted the landing of Hariri’s plane, and he met with King Salman the very next day. But MbS granted him an audience only two days after that, suggesting that the “reconciliation” is still incomplete. All the same, the media blackout supposedly reflected the fact that he had been busy there, engaging in series of confidential meetings with numerous officials with whom he “discussed Lebanon and the region.” But the stakes for Saudi Arabia are far higher than just “making up” with its Lebanese protégé after what happened in November—or “forgiving” him, depending on how the story is told. Legislative elections are coming in Lebanon in May. And things do not look good so far for the kingdom’s allies there. To start with, Hariri has stubbornly ignored Saudi Arabia’s Christian friends—mainly the Lebanese Forces of Samir Geagea and the Kataeb of Samy Gemayel, who used to be the Christian main allies of Hariri’s Future Current. He doesn’t want their candidates running on his slate at all. After Hariri returned to Lebanon from his Saudi detention in November, it appeared that both Geagea and Gemayel, who had visited the kingdom in September, had secretly lobbied Riyadh to help arrange Hariri’s dismissal and his replacement by a more “pugnacious” prime minister who could stand up to Hezbollah. Plus, Hariri is striking alliances in more than one constituency with their main Christian foe, Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, which is pro-Hezbollah. Unless Riyadh intervenes on their behalf and persuades Hariri to change his mind, the traditional share of seats in parliament for the pro-Saudi Christians will seriously decline this spring. At the same time, Hariri himself is a much-diminished figure. MbS did state in a Washington Post interview a few days ago that, thanks to what happened in November, Hariri “now is in a better position” in Lebanon, relative to Hezbollah. But he could not be more wrong.

The Sunni community in Lebanon did defend Hariri and demanded his return in November mainly because his apparent captivity represented a violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty. But the man himself has lost a large part of the support he enjoyed in the late 2000s. His weakness of character, his confused politics, and his tendency to run away from the country at each major crisis have long tired his followers, both those who wish he were not that lenient with Hezbollah and those who wish he would forgo his sporadic but dangerous outbursts against the Shiite party. Moreover, the war in Syria and the support that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have provided to some jihadist groups there have also put off many people in the Middle East, even among Sunnis, even in Lebanon. Finally, Hariri’s financial problems in the last few years—problems exacerbated by Riyadh itself—as well as his failure to pay the wages of his employees and political clients have done the rest. Hariri is aware of the situation, to the point that he will not run as a candidate in his own hometown of Saïda, and, according to some serious rumors, not even in Beirut where he has regularly won elections since the assassination of his father Rafiq in 2005. There is some talk about his targeting a whole new district, Hasbaya-Marjeyoun, whose constituents are unhappy about being surrounded by Shiite and Druze areas. Even in the Bekaa, Sunnis have already made it clear that they would prefer to vote in their majority for Aoun’s Sunni candidates.

Hariri’s Impossible Choice

BEIRUT, March 5 (Xinhua) — Lebanon and Brazil will sign a defense agreement, said visiting Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister Aloysio Nunes Ferreira Monday. The agreement will “open a legal framework for the cooperation that already exists between our two countries,” the minister said. Ferreira said so following meeting with Prime Minister Saad Hariri, said the […]

Mother Jones – RUSS CHOMA —  Special counsel Robert Mueller has expanded his investigation to look into the Trump White House’s ties to a Lebanese-American businessman who works closely with the de facto ruler of the United Arab Emirates, the New York Times reports. Saturday evening, the Times reported that Mueller has interviewed George Nader, a Lebanese businessman […]

by Business Insider –  Hilary Brueck — Emotional support peacocks. Emotional support snakes. Emotional support hamsters. People have been bringing all sorts of “support animals” into public places recently, arguing the creatures should be allowed to fly on planes and come into offices or restaurants because they serve a mental-health purpose. But what does an emotional support […]

Arab weekly  – By: Gareth Smyth – Lebanon’s resilience is famous. Since the civil war ended in 1990, Lebanon has survived Israeli onslaughts in 1996 and 2006, as well as the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Since 2011, Lebanon’s population has absorbed more than 1 million Syrian refugees. Some attribute such resilience to a political system based on compromises between sects, even when politicians are allied to rival regional powers. Others say Lebanon has survived due to its banking system. In a country with intermittent electricity and rampant nepotism, Lebanon’s banking sector excels. The regulatory framework imposed by the Central Bank, led since 1993 by Riad Salameh, showed its resilience in 2009. The world financial crisis barely rattled Lebanon’s banks. At the end of 2017, the banks’ assets in the domestic market were $220 billion. The six banks listed on the Beirut Stock Exchange have assets, including foreign operations, of $125 billion. The banks’ overall assets represent approximately four times Lebanon’s gross domestic product.

The banks’ importance is twofold. First, their earnings and receipt of remittances from Lebanese abroad mitigate a balance-of-trade deficit of $20.3 billion in 2017. Along with tourism receipts and foreign direct investment (FDI), this has resulted in a balance of payments deficit of just $156 million. This represents a deterioration on 2016’s $1.2 billion surplus but it is better news than it might have been. Second, the banks have financed government borrowing that took public debt to $78.15 billion in September 2017, up 4.6% year-on-year and 149% of GDP. Borrowing has financed a bloated public sector: From 2000-16, the International Monetary Fund said, 34.7% of public spending went to salaries. In the past three years, the government has appointed 26,000 extra staff. Bankers want reform. Some detect positive signs. A recent government circular called for a 20% reduction in non-salary spending. Ahead of April’s elections, there is newfound government efficiency in planning cabinet ratification of the 2018 budget. “Lebanon needs drastic structural adjustment, such as fighting fiscal evasion, which is $4.2 billion a year in a country with a $5 billion deficit,” said Marwan Barakat, chief economist at Banque Audi. “The deficit has to be reduced to ensure a soft landing.” The politicians assume the banks will forever rescue them, bankers say, thereby threatening not just the country’s banks but its entire economy. “The banking sector faces challenges,” said Nassib Ghobril, chief economist at Byblos Bank. “The first is the decline in lending opportunities in the private sector, due to the expanding public sector. Second, there are the continuing borrowing needs of the government. While the banking system — the Central Bank and the commercial banks — finances the deficit, we see no political will to reduce the fiscal deficit and implement reforms.”

The Daily Star BEIRUT: Lebanese politicians responded Saturday to the latest developments in the Ziad Itani case, after reports emerged that the actor had been framed by a former Internal Security Forces officer. President Michel Aoun called for all parties to comply with the confidentiality of the investigation – in which Itani stood charged of collaborating […]

Selfie of Lebenese PM Saad Hariri, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Khaled bin Salman, Kingdom’s ambassador to US. (Twitter/@saadhariri) by ArabNews – JEDDAH: Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri shared a selfie early Saturday with Saudi Arabia’s crown prince and his brother . The image, which will likely go viral on social media in both […]

By reuters – BEIRUT: Lebanon’s 2018 budget will likely be approved by cabinet before mid-March, its finance minister said, as the heavily indebted country seeks to agree its spending plans before an April 6 economic conference in Paris. The minister, Ali Hassan Khalil, has previously said Lebanon will not be able to ask international donors […]

by forbes  Angel Au-Yeung  – As Facebook continues to face scrutiny about its possible role in influencing the U.S. presidential election, a different kind of social network, Vero, has jumped the top of the charts, thrusting its Riyadh-based Lebanese billionaire cofounder into the spotlight. Vero became one of the most downloaded social apps worldwide in both […]