By Kareem Chehayeb: middleeastmonitor.com/

The Lebanese government’s mix-up with the Saudi-led anti-terror coalition isn’t just another example of its political chaos. It is a sign of how the country is more disjointed than ever; the empty presidential chair is just the tip of the iceberg.

Like Indonesia, Pakistan and Malaysia, Lebanon’s government wasn’t entirely aware of the fact that it was included in Riyadh’s counter-terrorism initiative, which many have been calling a coalition of Islamic nations. Prime Minister Tammam Salam, who leans towards the pro-West March 14 Alliance, welcomed Lebanon’s inclusion in the 34-state coalition, and believes that his country has a big role to play. Things got more interesting once the foreign ministry, under Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil of the Freedom Patriotic Movement (FPM), the largest Christian party of the pro-Assad and Iran March 8 Alliance, released a statement of its own. The foreign ministry wasn’t aware of Lebanon’s inclusion; it condemned the prime minister for making his statement without notifying officials, stating that the incident “impinges on the ministry’s prerogatives and its constitutional role in dealing with foreign policy.” This alone foreshadows some terrible consequences if Lebanon does commit to the coalition, and it’s only one of many reasons why it shouldn’t.

The Islamic label could cause problems

Even though Lebanon isn’t the civil state many of its people want it to be, it doesn’t have a state religion. Unlike most other countries in the region, it doesn’t have a Sunni Muslim majority; the difference between the number of Sunni and Shia Muslims, as well as Maronite Christians, isn’t significant.

More importantly, there are clear signs that the bipolar nature of Lebanon’s government is starting to change. Some Christian political parties from both the March 8 and March 14 groups are starting to find common ground, thus compromising for each other. This is obviously in light of the rise of Sunni extremism in the region, and the attempted ethnic cleansing of minority groups, notably the Yazidis and Christians in Iraq and Syria. The rhetoric from most Christian parties represents what Lebanese people heard during the civil war; their existence is at stake. You now see the FPM finding common ground with some March 14 Christian groups, specifically the Kataeb, which appear to take on a more moderate approach when it comes to their views in the region. Historically, the Kataeb have loathed Baathism, Pan-Arabism and Islamism in all its forms, yet they seemed to have toned down their anti-Assad rhetoric over the past year. In fact, Labour Minister Sejaan Azzi, a member of the Kataeb Party, also condemned the prime minister’s statement, despite being a political ally and thus siding with a major political rival.

Lebanon has been involved in a fierce war on extremism

Contrary to what some might say, jihadist movements haven’t started causing problems in Lebanon purely as a result of the uprising in Syria. In the summer of 2007, the Lebanese military engaged in a controversial battle against Fatah Al-Islam (not to be mistaken with the Palestinian political movement) and Jund Al-Sham who were in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr Al-Bared near Tripoli in the north of the country. The camp was bombed to such an extent by the Lebanese army in its operation to flush out the militants that its 35,000 residents were made homeless.

More recently, in 2012, extremist Sunni cleric Shaikh Ahmed Al-Assir was able to gather many Sunni supporters, mostly from impoverished neighbourhoods in Tripoli, Saida and Beirut, to protest against Hezbollah and the mainstream Sunni leaders who they believe aren’t taking this threat to their sect very seriously. The sit-ins and Friday prayer sermons turned to violence, most notably in 2013, when the army engaged in clashes with Al-Assir’s armed supporters.

Finally, Tripoli’s predominantly Sunni Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Alawite Jabal Mohsen neighbourhoods have been engaging in on-off clashes for decades. While both areas are among the poorest in Tripoli, Bab Al-Tabbaneh has been a breeding ground for Sunni extremist groups. As in other places, the people see these groups as protecting their existence as Sunnis, and the Lebanese army countering them as Shia Iran-controlled allies of Hezbollah.

The Lebanese army hostage crisis is not over

On 2 December, the Lebanese army swapped prisoners with Al-Qaeda’s Jabhat Al-Nusra group, which had held 16 Lebanese soldiers hostage for over a year, including Mohammed Hamieh, who was executed by the militants. In exchange for the soldiers, the army freed 13 prisoners affiliated with the group. Whether or not one thinks of this as a PR scam to try and clean up the government’s bad image, the hostage crisis is not over. Nine other soldiers are still being held hostage by Daesh. Things aren’t looking good on that front.

Lebanon negotiated with Jabhat Al-Nusra for a very long time, with Qatar as a mediator. However, the Lebanese military said that Daesh hasn’t been easy to talk to and, frankly, it doesn’t look like much progress will be made anytime soon. If Lebanon joins the Saudi coalition either by providing soldiers or intelligence, it might not be a smart move if the government wants to bring the remaining nine soldiers home alive.

Hezbollah – a fragile but pivotal relationship with the army

The last thing Hezbollah would want is Lebanon’s involvement in a Saudi-led military coalition. Hezbollah has been supporting the Assad regime in Syria, alongside Iran, against any and all opposition. Even though Daesh is a common enemy, Saudi Arabia and its allies want a future Syria without Assad. That’s obviously not the case for Hezbollah.

The Shia group and the Lebanese military have joined forces against Sunni extremists in Northern and Eastern Lebanon, notably Jabhat Al-Nusra and Daesh, as well as like-minded organisations. Hezbollah wouldn’t tolerate any of its intelligence or information that it might share with the Lebanese army being passed on to Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, the question of Hezbollah’s legitimacy as both a political party and armed militia remains very sensitive. For the most part, talk about the need for Hezbollah to disarm has diminished significantly, apart from within a few political parties, especially the pro-Saudi Future Movement. With Hezbollah’s support key in the Lebanese state’s war against extremism and its many loyal supporters, chaos could ensue if Lebanon sticks with Riyadh’s coalition. Prime Minister Salam says that Hezbollah won’t be targeted in the campaign, but would that be enough to convince the movement, its supporters and its allies?

Finally, Lebanon has always taken an officially neutral stance in the region, trying to stay on good terms with both the United States and Russia, as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is in order to prevent the country from collapsing into what many often speculate as another civil war. Is it possible to stick to that policy when committing to a Saudi-led coalition? It doesn’t seem like a politically sound move.

Kareem Chehayeb is a Lebanese writer based in Beirut. He is the co-founder Beirut Syndrome.