By  Samya Kullab

On Feb. 19, Saudi Arabia announced it was canceling $4 billion in aid earmarked for Lebanon since 2013 and imposed a travel ban for Saudi citizens to the Mediterranean country. The moves represented an unequivocal shift in Saudi foreign policy toward Lebanon, where for years the kingdom has competed with Iran for influence by backing the Sunni-led March 14 coalition, headed by the Future Movement of Saad Hariri, against Hezbollah and the rival March 8 coalition that it leads.

Saudi allies swiftly followed suit: Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates called on their citizens to leave Lebanon. Less than two weeks later, the Saudi-led six-member Gulf Cooperation Council formally branded Hezbollah a terrorist organization, blacklisting companies with any ties to the Shiite group, which is both Lebanon’s strongest political party and militia. The GCC cited security concerns that cells of Hezbollah were operating in their countries.

The Gulf actions have sparked fears of destabilization and economic crises in Lebanon, which is already overwhelmed by Syrian refugees and spillover from the civil war next door. The GCC has also alienated an already enfeebled Sunni leadership, possibly playing into the hands of Saudi Arabia’s enemies in a country governed by a delicate sectarian balance.
 
In Lebanese political and business circles, the decline in Saudi support was felt directly after the death of King Abdullah last year. Media organizations owned by Hariri and supported by the Saudis reported reduced cash flows. Money to finance major public works projects or to shape municipal elections also dried up.

Though diplomatic ties unraveled quickly after the Saudi announcement to cut aid—$3 billion of which was meant to bolster Lebanon’s army—many Lebanese see it as a culmination of the more assertive stance adopted by the new Saudi monarch, King Salman. Riyadh appears to be ramping up pressure on Hezbollah and pushing its Lebanese allies to adopt a more critical, even confrontational attitude toward the group and its activities in region—and by extension, those of its patron, Iran.
 
The Saudi sanctions come after tensions between Riyadh and Tehran reached a boiling point when Saudi authorities executed an influential dissident Shiite cleric, Nimr al-Nimr, in January, prompting an angry mob of protesters to set fire to the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. Saudi Arabia promptly cut diplomatic ties with Iran after the attack.  

Rather than hurt Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia’s actions appear to have strengthened its political standing by dividing and demoralizing the Future Movement.

The rift with Lebanon was triggered in January when Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, whose Free Patriotic Movement party is an ally of Hezbollah, refused to support an Arab League resolution condemning Iran and Hezbollah over the embassy attack. To the Saudis, the refusal was a clear indication of Hezbollah’s growing political power in Beirut at the expense of Hariri’s Future Movement.
 
Sunni power in Lebanon has been on the decline since the assassination of Hariri’s father, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, in 2005. Saad Hariri’s recent failed attempt to resolve the country’s two-year-old presidential crisis exemplifies how his party is unable to shape domestic politics. Lebanon has been without a president since May 2014, due to lack of consensus between the March 14 coalition and its rival March 8 bloc and a boycott by members of parliament allied with the latter. Even March 8 lawmaker Suleiman Frangieh, Hariri’s compromise pick for the presidency, failed to show up in parliament earlier this month, despite being asked to do so by the Future Movement leader.
 
This brinkmanship—paired with rising anti-Saudi rhetoric on the part of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and the group’s reported participation in regional conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Iraq—might help explain the Saudi rationale for the punitive moves, at least from a tactical perspective. But Lebanon is clearly the wrong playing field for such scorched-earth policies.
 
Rather than hurt Hezbollah, the kingdom’s actions appear to have strengthened its political standing by dividing and demoralizing the Future Movement. While many of the latter’s members have since vocally condemned Hezbollah in an effort to mend ties with Riyadh, privately members express frustration with their inability to either oppose or placate the Saudis. “Hezbollah is part of government decision-making, how can we do this [appease the Saudis] without collapsing into strife?” asked one member of parliament, who asked not to be identified. “What they are asking is impossible.”
 
Even Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk, a staunch Future member, could not bring himself to classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization at the 33rd conference of the Arab Interior Ministers Council in Tunis on March 3, citing “government solidarity.”
 
But some Sunni leaders see opportunity in the disorder: Justice Minister Ashraf Rifi, a member of the Future Movement, announced his resignation and berated the “domination” of Hezbollah in the Cabinet, dealing a blow to the fragile executive body and indicating how Sunni leadership in Lebanon has become a house divided.
 
Some consider Rifi’s move an attempt to shore up support from Lebanon’s broader Sunni constituency, by portraying himself as an honest leader willing to sacrifice a Cabinet post to protest growing Shiite influence. In this way, the Saudi move might open the door for other Sunni leaders to carve out their own centers of influence independent of the Future Movement, which has monopolized Sunni politics since 2005.
 
Meanwhile, with approximately 500,000 Lebanese workers active in Gulf countries, fears abound that their possible expulsion could damage Lebanon’s fragile remittance-dependent economy. Around 43 percent of total Lebanese remittances come from Arab countries, most of them in the GCC.
 
Already, 90 Lebanese nationals working in Saudi Arabia have been deported, according to Elie Rizk, head of the Saudi-Lebanese Economic Development Committee, with more expected. It is unclear whether Gulf divestment from Lebanese firms might soon follow.
 
According to Moody’s credit-rating agency, the immediate impact of travel restrictions imposed by the GCC on Lebanon would be insignificant, but further deterioration of diplomatic ties could lead to a slowdown of remittances, reduce foreign exchange reserves, and disrupt trade flows. Gulf countries account for 27 percent of total Lebanese exports.
 
Militarily, the move will have very little short-term impact, according to Aram Nerguizian, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who monitors the Lebanese armed forces. “But there is a short-term morale effect,” he says. “It’s not a good day when you wake up in the Lebanese armed forces and Saudi military counterparts are telling you they have no idea what happened.” In the long term, a chunk of funding focused on maritime security could be axed as a result of Saudi cuts.
 
Despite the Saudi aid withdrawal, Lebanon’s army can look to other international support, albeit on a much smaller scale. It is still establishing its 3rd Land Border Regiment, stationed south of the Masnaa border, the main crossing into Syria, largely with British and Canadian military aid that so far amounts to just $500,000. Saudi Arabia’s exit might prompt other countries to chip in or increase existing contributions. The United States, for one, has already spent $1.3 billion building up Lebanon’s military capabilities.
 
That said, it is still possible the Saudis might reverse course and restore the status quo—if they see that their actions are weakening their Lebanese allies and benefiting their enemies. If not, the future of the Future Movement, and of Lebanon, is up in the air.

Samya Kullab is an independent Canadian journalist based in the Middle East and a former reporter for Lebanon’s Daily Star.