By MAYSSA EL KHAZEN,
Introduction:
In today
The Creation and Construction of the Enemy:
The media plays a central role in the projection of enemy images, a vital pre-requisite to war.[1] In the beginning, the enemy is created and this is a crucial phase in media reporting because once the enemy is constructed, the depiction becomes a ‘fact’ and every event that involves the ‘enemy’ is seen as evil. Often, Medias exaggerate the threat posed by the ‘enemy’ to justify use of force. The media play an important role in sanctioning the resort to organized violence by not only suggesting the inefficacy of other options but also by presenting an enemy so threatening that it requires to be self-defensively engaged.[2] In the case of Hezbollah, Western and non-Western Medias have long played an important role in creating an image of the group in accordance with what specific countries perceive it to be.
For the
Hezbollah: Background
Islamic radicalism first erupted in
Next, in order to understand the Arab media’s depiction of Hezbollah as resistance fighters in Lebanon, it is crucial to comprehend the society structure within Lebanon and observe how the Shiite’s undermining led to the creation and rise of a movement which spoke up for this underrepresented community in Lebanese politics.
Hezbollah as Resistance:
Since the 19th century, the Shiites of Lebanon were situated in the South and later also moved to
After the founding of the independent Lebanese state in 1943, the Shiite were the third largest community after the Maronite Christians and the Sunni Muslims. In the Lebanese constitution, they were accorded the second political office as the speaker of the parliament. In practice, however, they exerted little influence in Lebanese politics. In the government, they were largely underrepresented in senior appointments. In addition illiteracy and poverty was widespread amongst the Shiite community. Until the 1940s, most Shiites were agricultural workers. In the 1950s and 1960s, as education, mobility and the increased access to communications grew, political mobilization was essential for the Shiites. Moreover, as agriculture was modernized and the Shiite population grew, many moved to
It was in this environment that a charismatic Iranian-born Shiite cleric of Lebanese descent, Musa Sadr launched a reform movement, harakat al-mahrumin (the Movement of the Deprived). By 1974, the Movement had attracted tens of thousands of Shiite. During the period of pre-civil war
At this point, four main events occurred in 1978 that benefited to the emergence of Hezbollah. First, after the strange disappearance of Sadr, members of Amal became even more alienated from the rest of the Lebanese. Hence, the marginalization of the Lebanese Shiite community and its under representation in the government was a driving motive for the need to reform. Second, in southern
Hence, as we can see, Hezbollah justify itself as a resistance because its whole emergence is based on the very undermining of the Shiites. After 1982, they began a struggle to drive Israeli troops from
Hezbollah as Terrorists:
To understand why Hezbollah is regarded as terrorists, it is important to take the Western and more specifically the
Formed in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of
Furthermore, Hezbollah are described as:
known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-US terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombings of the US Embassy in
Hence, as we can see, the
In an article written by Roger Hardy in BBC and titled “The Lebanese crisis explained,” Hezbollah is described to have been created by
During the 2006 July war,
During the July war, CNN, BBC and other
Arab Media and Hezbollah’s depiction:
In the same way that Western Medias construct a portrayal of Hezbollah that is terrorist, Al Jazeera and other Arab Medias especially Al Manar – Hezbollah’s official News channel, were equally in the business of constructing an identity for Hezbollah. In addition to Al Manar, Hezbollah operates a radio station Al Nour. Also, Kabdat Alla (the fist of God) is their monthly magazine. Al Manar broadcasts news in Arabic, English, French and Hebrew and is widely watched both in
In March 1997, an article in
Psychological warfare can be used as a weapon of war to be added to the military materiel, not only to repulse the aggression, but also to confront the enemy’s deceptive policy toward the world public. Although this war has many faces, it has one head only, namely the media. Hizballah entered this field through a wide door via the international Internet network two months ago, and precisely via the al-Manar television station. Hizballah’s step is primarily aimed at refuting the fallacies
Furthermore in a September 2001 interview, Hassan Ezzieddine, head of Hizbollah’s department of Media Relations at the time, stated:
We feel that the media can be effective in creating a special climate in public opinion on the main issues of interest…We are heading toward a new sensitive security situation (in the region) which means we need to follow events very closely so that we can informatively help shape international and Arab public opinion…We believe that the media has an important role in the conflict, as important as the military wing.[15]
As we can observe, Hezbollah places great emphasis on the role of media for the creation and construction of their image and who they are. Furthermore, they seek to deny the image and construction of Western media regarding their depiction as terrorists and constantly show that Israelis – supported by the
During the July war, several media commentators and journalists have alleged and intentionally distorted coverage of the events, in favour of Hezbollah, by means of photo manipulation, staging by Hezbollah or by journalists, and false or misleading captioning.[16] On 18 July 2006 Hezbollah Press Officer Hussein Nabulsi took CNN’s Nic Robertson on a special tour of southern
Additionally, Reuters withdrew over 900 photographs by Adnan Hajj, a Lebanese freelance photographer, after he admitted to digitally adding and darkening smoke spirals in photographs of an attack on
Also, the vast amount of pictures of civilian deaths shown on Al jazeera, Al Manar, and other Arab televisions further served for the anti-Israeli sentiments across the Arab world. CNN, on the other hand, showed fewer images, but concentrated more on every incident that took place in
Hezbollah as a Media-Constructed Image:
“I don’t think you can fight a war today without taking into account the media focus, that’s a reality today. So you have to plan how to handle your media strategy, just as you plan your operational strategy for any campaign.” (Col P.J. Crawley, spokesman National Security Council)[21]
As Colonel Crawley puts it in the above quote, media planning and organization is a must when you fight any war because public opinion and perception of the conflict is central to gain and maintain support. The role of the media shapes public opinion and sentiments as it can either be a patriot or a propagandist, a laptop or a watchdog, an observer and participant or a catalyst. The media becomes part of the conflict as it reports in matters of minutes, by using satellites, the ‘facts’ it wants to show. Policy-makers in developed countries (and later elsewhere) have always exploited the media to gather public support for their domestic and foreign policies. Many governments, both democratic and authoritarian, have also used the media, mainly international broadcasting, to influence foreign public opinions, what is often referred to as “public diplomacy”.[22] Furthermore, the media often conveys Government’s policies to the public and push their own agendas. The power of the media is such that they have been credited on a number of occasions with encouraging foreign interventions or for being responsible for national setbacks.[23]
With the emergence of global media, policy-makers now face the difficult tasks of explaining their policies to the public via a large number of often critical media outlets and of trying to stem the impact of the latter, particularly of television, on their freedom of action. Television pictures, with their potent emotional content, have completely
transformed the general public’s relation to news and its perception of international
affairs. Hence, that is why during the Lebanon-Israel war in July, increasing pressure was placed on world leaders to reach a resolution. Yet, both Western and Arab Medias used the pictures in their best interest to fabricate an identity for the enemy; for the West, they concentrated on Israelis victims and hence making Hezbollah look as a ‘terrorist’ group and for Arab Medias, they showed all the innocent Lebanese civilians killed to portray Israel as the ‘enemy’ and Hezbollah as the ‘resistance.’
Hence, with the vast range of media controversies, one asks what then is the identity of Hezbollah? Are they a legitimate political entity? A terrorist group? Or maybe both? As we have seen, since the media plays the role of creating an image for Hezbollah- one that suits the Government’s or owner’s best interest- there is then no real image to associate them with. Hezbollah’s identity has been fabricated by various Medias trying to prove who they really are. Thus, Hezbollah is going to be regarded according to one’s beliefs and stances, and based on the media coverage one chooses to trust. Throughout the Arab and Moslem world, Hezbollah is regarded as a legitimate resistance movement.[24] In addition, the Lebanese government regards it as a legitimate resistance against occupation. On the other hand, the
Next, it is imperative to analyze how the respective Medias’ construction of the identity of Hezbollah manifested itself in the viewers and readers’ public opinion. According to a survey released by the "
On the other hand, ABC News and Washington post conducted a poll in the
We can observe the popularity and significance the media possesses over forming and reinforcing public opinions regarding the particular perception of a group, here being Hezbollah. It is obvious to note how the different framing of issues and conflicts determines public understanding. Additionally, the diverse construction built by respective Medias, leads to enhanced debates on Hezbollah’s identity. Thus, more importance is given to what and who Hezbollah are rather than a broader depiction of causes and solutions.
The most powerful weapons in media coverage are images and myths told about conflicts. Theorists who write about images, myths and stereotypes mostly focus on pre-existing, value-laden groups of ideas derived from culture and transmitted by communication. Kuhn discusses how elements of images and representations produce meanings within social and historical contexts which are spread through mass media through narratives and myths. Roach states that images and myths sustain beliefs that justify war-making and the need to view the ‘other’ as the enemy.[34] In consequence, viewers and readers believe in the media’s construction and representation of the enemy and its depiction of the identity of Hezbollah based on their cultural norms and values. Hitherto, Hezbollah as a media-constructed image produces meaning, and while this meaning might appear to be natural, it is in fact produced. As Barthes notes, meanings are constructed through identifiable processes of signification in all representations.[35]
Conclusion:
In this essay, I have argued that Western and Arab Medias construct a portrayal and identity for Hezbollah – by picking certain facts and ignoring other facts – that suits their cultural beliefs and norms. Their different construction is not ‘correct’, or ‘true’ or even ‘more true’ than the other construction. I have additionally observed that Hezbollah as terrorists justifies Israeli extraordinary measures while Hezbollah as resistance justifies their kidnappings and their celebration as heroes. Furthermore, Bernstein argues that News discourse is based not merely on facts, but also on information that is invariably interpreted in a subjective way. He also claims that “stereotyping is an ideological process that works to the advantage of the powerful groups in society.”[36] From this, we can draw that media in general constructs and creates stereotypes based on ‘facts’ they choose to display on television and/or news articles. Thus, Hezbollah has been stereotyped and interpreted to be something that conforms to norms and beliefs of a certain community. Consequently, neither construction can demonstrate greater weight on truth that the other.
Based on the respective stereotypes of the ‘enemy’ and the media’s construction of the identity of Hezbollah, it becomes easy to speak about the image of Hezbollah perceived without systematic assessment. In order to resolve the issue, a gradual deconstruction of stereotypes is necessary. However, this process cannot simply be achieved by adopting a new political discourse. It involves the development of a strong civil society. Images that illustrate how the government and the media relate to simplistic personifications of the enemy as threats further compound the problem of the misunderstanding over Hezbollah’s identity since it is media-constructed. There is no news or background whatsoever that explains Hezbollah’s gradual rise, but simple interpretations of its identity based on a couple events that they were held accountable for. In the case of the West, they held them accountable for the bombing attacks directed at the
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[2] Susan Carruthers, ‘The Media at War,’ P.44
[3] Maura Conway, ‘Cybercortical Warfare: The Case of Hizbollah.Org’ P. 8
[4] The Quran, “The Table” (Al-ma’idah), verse 56.
[5] Avi Jorisch, “Beacon of Hatred,” Chapter 1, P. 6
[6] Avi Jorisch, “Beacon of Hatred,” Chapter 1, P. 7
[7] Avi Jorisch, “Beacon of Hatred,” Chapter 1, P. 7
[8] Maura Conway, ‘Cybercortical Warfare: The Case of Hizbollah.Org’ P. 9
[9] Maura Conway, ‘Cybercortical Warfare: The Case of Hizbollah.Org’ P. 9
[10] Roger Hardy, ‘ The Lebanese Crisis Explained.’
[11] David Campbell, ‘Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of identity.’ P. 51
[12] BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4093579.stm
[13] Maura Conway, ‘Cybercortical Warfare: The Case of Hizbollah.Org’ P. 11
[14] FBIS (1997)
[15]Blanford 2001
[16] Tom Gross, ‘Media Missiles’
[17] CNN Reliable Sources
[18] Charlie Moore, ‘Ancient Hatreds Hardening in
[20] Steve Hermann, ‘Trusting Photos.’
[21] “How the war was spun”: BBC World TV,
[22] Morand Fachot, ‘The Media Dimension in Foreign Interventions’ P. 5
[23] Morand Fachot, ‘The Media Dimension in Foreign Interventions’ P. 5
[24] Dahr Jamail, ‘Hezbollah’s Transformation’
[25] BBC news, ‘Quick Guide: Hezbollah’
[26] EU, “The EU’s Relations with
[27] Dhimmi Watch, ‘EU lawmakers label Hizbollah ‘terrorist’ group, but still seem to court negotiations’
[28] Blanford, Nicholas, ‘Israeli strikes may boost Hizbullah base’
[29]
[30] Angus Reid Global Scan, ‘Palestinians Hold Hezbollah in High Regard’
[31] Angus Reid Global Scan, ‘Hamas, Hezbollah Legitimate for Jordanians’
[32] Polling Report.com
[33] Bill O’reilly, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,207574,00.html
[34] Lea Mandelzis, P.2
[35] Lea Mandelzis, P.2
[36] Lea Mandelzis, P.2