by Elliott Abrams & Zachary Shapiro — Politico — the 2006 evacuation was an overall success. But according to a 2007 assessment from the Government Accountability Office, the internal federal government watchdog, the operation demonstrated a number of difficulties that called for changes that would be even more important in a larger and more complex future conflict. The report found that evacuation from Lebanon presented the State Department and Pentagon with several significant challenges. First, it was undertaken during an ongoing conflict in which evacuation routes were blocked. Safely navigating sea routes required difficult coordination with Israeli forces while they conducted a war. And because the crisis was unforeseen, the U.S. military did not have naval assets immediately available for a sea evacuation. If there is another round between Israel and Hezbollah this year, all those problems will be greatly magnified.

Ultimately, the GAO identified three major shortcomings:

First, the magnitude of the Lebanon crisis taxed State’s capacity to respond. Second, State did not communicate effectively with the public, including potential evacuees in Lebanon and their family and friends in the United States. For example, State initially restricted the ability of U.S. Embassy officials in Beirut to convey critical information via the media to Americans seeking to leave Lebanon. Third, State and the Department of Defense’s different institutional cultures and systems impeded their ability to work together; among other things, these differences resulted in miscommunications and possible delays in chartering ships and planes to evacuate American citizens. As it turns out, the 2006 evacuation was precedent-setting in one way: U.S. Embassy employees in Beirut were overwhelmed with calls from U.S. nationals seeking to leave, realized that they could not carry out the operation on their own, and turned to the Pentagon. The State Department was able to carry out the majority of the 80 or more evacuations it undertook all over the world from 2001-2006 using only commercial flights. Not this time.

From July 14-23, State and DOD were able to evacuate nearly 10,000 U.S. nationals to Cyprus. Yet the sudden spike in demand for hotel rooms for the U.S. entities, coupled with the fact that Cyprus was at the height of its summer tourist season, made accommodations scarce. The situation became so desperate that the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia and the Cypriot government “arrange[d] for the Americans to stay at the Nicosia fairgrounds, in large exhibit halls normally used for trade shows.” Generally, the Pentagon’s role is restricted to evacuating U.S. nationals to “a safe haven” (often a local military base or embassy). The State Department then supervises the final step: return trips to the United States. Yet the influx of tourists in Cyprus prompted the Pentagon to assist with booking charter and military planes to get the U.S. citizens from safe havens back to the United States. In fact, the military was responsible for most return trips to the United States. Because of the intensity and scale of the war, the State Department was unable to rely on its existing emergency plans. For instance, the Beirut emergency plan did not account for the possibility that Israel would bomb the airport—which it did right at the outset of the 2006 conflict.

In addition, many U.S. citizens who had never registered with the U.S. Embassy sought evacuation assistance as the war went on. Their numbers and whereabouts were unknown to embassy personnel and had not been included in the prior emergency planning. To make matters worse, the GAO report found that the State and DOD have “different institutional cultures and systems, which impeded their ability to work together,” including clashing terminology and methodology. For example, “where State officials might request 10 planes, DOD officials would want to know the precise numbers of people and tonnage of equipment to be transported.” This was compounded by some degree of overlapping duties, resulting in inadvertent self-sabotage: “State and DOD were competing for some of the same commercial planes, thereby creating duplicate requests that gave the perception of fewer available planes for contract.” The State Department has made several adjustments to expedite future evacuations, working to improve embassies’ communications guidelines, submitting best practices reports to other embassies, and presumably revising the Beirut emergency plan. Still, the prospect of a larger and more intense war ahead leaves many open questions.

Ready for the Next Round?

Is the United States ready for the next round in Lebanon? By all accounts, there remain something like 15,000-25,000 Americans, and perhaps more, in Lebanon. If war breaks out, every indication is that it will be a fiercer conflict than in 2006. The U.S. Embassy will not have two weeks or more before ground combat begins—and it was in those first two weeks when most Americans were evacuated last time. The airport and seaport are sure to be closed again. Ground routes for getting Americans to safety will be harder to carve out when there is air and ground combat throughout the country. Of course temporary cease-fires can be tried, and the ports could be opened for hours at a time—but the logistical burden falling on State and DOD, and the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in particular, will be far greater than last time. It can be assumed that the Pentagon will have to take on the same, or even more, responsibilities than in 2006. Has it prepared to use warships or to lease ferries for the evacuation? Is the embassy fully ready with a communications package to reach all Americans at once, perhaps using the technologies that were new and not widespread in 2006? Has the embassy increased the percentage of Americans who have registered, so that it has a far better grasp of who and where they are? Has the United States discussed all the evacuation issues with the Israeli government and military, agreeing now on plans to cope and methods of working together if war starts? Perhaps war will be avoided, and perhaps there will be a slow and steady buildup of tension during which time Americans can begin to leave safely. But it’s at least as likely that war will break out suddenly—stranding thousands of Americans who then desperately seek help to get to safety. The time to work through these problems is right now