by Rami G. Khouri dailystar.com.lb

Attacks
by Daesh (ISIS) terrorists in Jordan and Lebanon in the past week
reflect a troubling new angle to that group’s strategy as its heartland
in northern Syria and Iraq increasingly shrinks in the face of
coordinated military attacks against it. These bombings are not dramatic
new developments, as Daesh has carried out similar attacks in both
countries in the past few years, and other planned bombings were
thwarted. Yet they are fresh cause for concern because they reflect
apparent attempts by Daesh – and its technical ability – to try to
destabilize smaller states like Lebanon and Jordan that have played
direct roles in the military fight to destroy it.

The two suicide
attacks at the north Jordan border post of Rukban and the north Lebanon
town of Al-Qaa left over a dozen dead and scores wounded, and these
followed an earlier attack against a Jordanian intelligence post near
Baqaa refugee camp near Amman. They are particularly significant because
they took place in locations that are assumed to be heavily protected
by both the military and security forces of Lebanon and Jordan; and in
Lebanon’s case, the non-state power Hezbollah also plays a major role in
securing Lebanon’s border region from attacks from Syrian territory.

The
targets of the attacks are no surprise in themselves. Hezbollah has
actively fought inside Syria against Daesh, the Nusra Front, and other
militant Salafist-takfiri groups in Syria that are trying to bring down
the Syrian government of Bashar Assad, while the Jordanian armed forces
and security services have actively supported rebel groups fighting for
the same aim and also in some cases directly attacked Daesh in Syria. In
recent years Daesh has also eyed Lebanon and Jordan as two targets for
its expansion plans in the region.

The likelihood of Daesh
causing major damage or instability in either country is slim. The
biggest danger in both places is not large-scale direct military attacks
such as Daesh used to expand its territory in Syria and Iraq. Rather,
it is how perpetuation of the current status quo can lead to damaging
conditions in several realms: panic among citizens who might fear their
very able security institutions cannot stop such attacks in Jordan and
Lebanon; worsening economic conditions especially due to declines in
tourism, foreign investment, and exports; increased support for Daesh
and other such radical groups by small numbers of disgruntled locals who
sense few if any prospects for their improved political or
socioeconomic well-being; and, emigration of the youngest and brightest
citizens who might lose faith in their future prospects at home.

While
acknowledging that Daesh and other such movements appeal to very small
numbers of Arab citizens, it is also important to recognize that this is
how these extremist and militant movements traditionally gained support
among local populations across the Arab world in the past quarter
century or so. These movements identify real sources of pain,
grievances, and unmet material and political needs among Arab citizens,
over years slowly build a narrative and a set of actions that respond to
those needs, and finally strike by activating their political,
military, and social reconstruction programs in areas where they feel
they have sufficient local support.

Those areas in fact have been
few and far between, and have always been short-lived, because the
mainstream Arab populace has always rejected such violent ideologies.
When existing state, non-state, and international powers in the region
finally coordinated their military attacks against it, Daesh this year
lost territory in several places in Iraq, Syria and Libya. The
liberation of Fallujah in Iraq is the latest example of this, and is an
important step on the path toward liberating Mosul and Raqqa cities.

These
eventualities will badly damage the logistical ability of Daesh to
manage its so-called state and caliphate, which are likely to collapse,
but they may not signal the end of the many stressful dynamics in Arab
society that generate support for the group among desperate citizens.
Daesh knows this and therefore probably keeps carrying out attacks like
this week’s in Lebanon and Jordan, mainly to appeal to small groups of
increasingly desperate citizens in lands that over the past half a
century have been unable to generate conditions that meet the basic life
needs of all their citizens.

This is a futile cause and a battle
that Daesh will lose in the end, because its ways are so alien to the
vast majority of Arab citizens. This week’s attacks, however, remind us
of what we should expect until that final defeat occurs, and that the
ultimate victory over Daesh, Al-Qaeda and other such extremists will
emanate only from policies that provide Arab citizens with descent and
dignified lives, rather than from any military prowess.

Rami G. Khouri is published twice weekly by THE DAILY STAR. He can be followed on Twitter at @RamiKhouri.