London (CNN Business)The coronavirus pandemic may be forcing Renault and Nissan to rethink their strained relationship. Already under huge pressure from slumping sales and profits in 2019, the collapse in global car demand this year could push the French and Japanese companies much closer together to cut costs and share the burden of building a new generation of electric vehicles. The carmakers have been partners since 1999, cooperating on strategy and product development while never taking the plunge and completing a full merger. Together with junior partner Mitsubishi Motors, the unique industry alliance employs roughly 450,000 people and in 2018 it sold roughly one in every nine cars around the world. Yet the partnership began its third decade in turmoil. The 2018 arrest of former alliance boss Carlos Ghosn, a turnaround expert credited with keeping Renault and Nissan in business, sparked a series of leadership changes at both carmakers, confusion over their strategy and questions over whether the sputtering relationship had outlived its usefulness.

Renault participated in merger talks with a European rival, and there were major questions over how the alliance would revive its fortunes in North America, where Nissan is a significant player but its French counterpart is not. Analysts also raised questions about cultural differences at the companies. The companies have so far largely maintained separate manufacturing facilities. Sharing production at the plant in Sunderland could be a sign that the carmakers have set aside their differences and are responding to the crisis by helping each other to cut costs. Ghosn, who was arrested on charges of understating his income, has always denied charges of financial impropriety. He had hoped to bring the companies much closer together, and he has blamed his arrest on a Nissan conspiracy aimed at preventing further integration with Renault. Nissan disputes this narrative.

by blocksats.com -- According to a poll widely published on Twitter, more than half of the 6,661 voters would choose to receive their salary in Bitcoin. Although they prefer to receive dollar bills, they are not interested in receiving the money in their own fiat currency, which has collapsed against the US currency. In 2020, economic turmoil and distrust in banks that increased during the coronavirus caused people to adopt the world’s main digital asset.

Unprecedented economic collapse The result makes sense, given that Lebanon is facing an unprecedented economic collapse, where prices for basic goods have doubled in at least the past two months, leaving them out of reach of half the population. Prime Minister Hassan Diab also acknowledged that Lebanon is on the verge of an “unimaginable food crisis”. Its long-standing currency continues to fall and is still being used to pay for imports. The crisis is likely to hit the impoverished communities more strongly and put more pressure on the middle class, widening the gap between the elite and the rest. The banking system in the country is also destabilized, with protests over central banks and bank branches increasing.

By Osama Habib, The Daily Star Beirut - The real estate giant Solidere made a comeback to profitability after selling close to $500 million in properties over the past two years, allowing it to settle all its debts, the company's vice president Ghazi Youssef said Friday. “We did relatively well despite the crisis that engulfed Lebanon. We sold around $450 million to $500 million worth of land in the Downtown district in the past two years. We had debts of around $600 million in the past and now I can say we are no longer in the red,” Youssef told The Daily Star over the telephone. Youssef expressed his belief that many Lebanese have chosen to invest their money in real estate. “There is around $5 billion in cash in the market and it seems some [people] have preferred to buy land in Solidere because they think it’s a sound investment,” he added.

Solidere has been struggling with the acute political and financial crisis that struck Lebanon in recent years. The company implemented a restructuring plan to cut costs last year. However, rigid capitals control imposed by the banks since late last year, coupled with the sharp devaluation of the Lebanese pound, drove many investors and bank customers to search for a safer investment, especially since most of them could not transfer money abroad or carry out financial transactions with other countries.

by middleeasteye.net -- Christopher Phillips -- The political futures of both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have recently been the subject of speculation. For Assad, a dispute with his wealthy cousin amid grumblings from his ally, Russia, has prompted some to wonder whether his bloody reign may soon end. For Erdogan, the fallout from the Covid-19 crisis and associated economic uncertainty has led to murmurs about his potential departure. Yet, such speculation rarely outlines how these neighbouring strongmen would actually be toppled. Both rule over regimes, whether inherited (in Assad’s case) or created (in Erdogan’s), that make it difficult for rivals - from either within the ruling establishment or without - to overthrow them.

'Coup-proofing' the state: As is the case in many autocratic states, Assad and Erdogan have tried to “coup-proof” their regimes to ensure they can withstand far more dramatic setbacks than either currently faces. Coup-proofing is, according to author James Quinlivan, “the set of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup”. This is more common in states such as Turkey and Syria, where there is a history of military intervention in politics. The methods vary from state to state, but Quinlivan notes similarities in the coup-proofing of Saudi Arabia, Syria and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Standout methods include packing key security positions with those tied to the ruler by family, ethnicity or religion; building up armed forces parallel to the regular military; and developing multiple overlapping internal security agencies monitoring the military and one another to prevent coups.

Assad inherited a regime that his father had coup-proofed par excellence. The extent of successful coup-proofing was seen when he avoided any serious attempt by establishment insiders to topple him, despite losing more than half of the country at one point during the recent civil war. Though thousands of soldiers defected and joined the opposition, those in key security positions, mostly from his own Alawi sect and family, stayed loyal. Similarly, the key security divisions fighting rebels in the early stages of the conflict were the “parallel structures”: the Republican Guard and the 4th Armoured Division, armed with the best equipment to defend the regime. Though it is unknown whether there were attempts at coups - there were several rumours - their absence suggests the myriad security agencies Syria had on the eve of the war proved effective.